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Abstract
The long-standing problem of quantum information pro-
cessing is to remove the classical channel from quantum
communication. Introducing a new information process-
ing technique, it is discussed that both insecure and secure
quantum communications are possible without the require-
ment of classical channel.
Around 1970, Wiesner first realized [1] quantum state can be used
to ensure security of private data. Security reason apart, the idea
of using quantum state for information processing was new, but
because of delayed publication it then silently laid the foundation
of modern quantum information. However, quantum information
received widespread attention after the discovery of quantum key
distribution (QKD) [2, 3], quantum computation [3], teleportation
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[4]. Except the local quantum computation, all are basically quan-
tum communication protocols. To execute these protocols a supple-
mentary classical channel is required. In other words, in quantum
communication, classical channel is needed to transmit message.
One may inquire why quantum mechanics cannot provide a quan-
tum channel to transmit message.
In their famous paper on teleportation [4], Bennett et al have
apparently given some answer to this query. They argued that un-
known quantum state cannot be teleported without classical chan-
nel. If it is possible it will prove the existence of superluminal signal.
The intended meaning and reasoning can be easily understood but
the problem is, they have implicitly assumed that classical channel
is the only legitimate tool for sending logical 0 and 1 to transmit
message. And now the assumption has almost become irrefutable
theorem. Here we shall see that logical 0 and 1 can also be coded
and decoded in quantum fashion. It means, a qubit can represent
logical 0 and 1. It implies that quantum channel can alone trans-
mit message, and in quantum computation, controlled gates can be
controlled quantum mechanically by receiving human instructions.
Before constructing our quantum channel let us classify the clas-
sical channels. This might help explore the reason behind their as-
sumption.
1. Deterministic classical channel: Here every bit can be determin-
istically recovered. Example: existing classical channel in absence
of noise.
2. Probabilistic classical channel: Here every bit can be statistically
recovered. Example: two induced noise levels greater than the en-
vironmental noise can represent the two bit values ( this channel
[5] can provide computational security).
Let us construct channels using quantum states.
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1. Channel A: Two orthogonal quantum states represent the two
bit values.
2. Channel B: Two nonorthogonal quantum states represent the
two bit values.
3. Channel C: Two ensembles of quantum states represent the two
bit values (in ensemble interpretation, however, individual state has
no place as perceived by Einstein[6]).
The channel A is a deterministic channel and classical message
can be sent through it. The channel B is a probabilistic quantum
channel and message cannot be sent through it [7]. The channel
C is another kind of probabilistic channel but message can be sent
through it. The channel A is quantum counterpart of determin-
istic classical channel and the channel C is quantum counterpart
of probabilistic classical channel. These two channels cannot pro-
vide quantum encryption where no-cloning principle [8] provides
security. For Channel A, no-cloning principle breaks down and for
channel C it is not applicable. As a whole, these two channels do
not carry any signature of quantum information processing, and
therefore, they may not be called as truly quantum channel (like
quantum states do not necessarily perform quantum computation).
From the above discussion it seems that truly quantum channel
does not exist to transmit plain or secure message.
We shall see that such channel do exist. To construct such quan-
tum channel we need two sufficiently distinguishable sequences of
quantum states to represent the two bit values. The most simple
sequences are the sequences of two nonorthogonal states, say 0◦ and
45◦ single photon polarized states. Suppose in the sequence, repre-
senting bit 0, 0◦ and 45◦ photons are at the even and odd positions
respectively, and in the sequence representing bit 1, the 0◦ and 45◦
photons are at odd and even positions respectively. Let us also
assume that receiver share the information of these two sequences
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and only a single bit - a sequence - is sent. The question is, how
receiver will definitely recover the bit value by measurements. Sup-
pose receiver sets the analyzer at 0◦ for every even event. If he/she
gets ”yes” results at every even position then the bit is definitely
0. If he does not get so, the bit is definitely 1. This is a new type
of probabilistic quantum channel but not secure quantum channel,
and message can be sent through it. Message can be seen as a
sequence of two operating sequences of quantum states. For quan-
tum security, legitimate users have to generate a arbitrarily long
sequence of randomly operating two sequences of random states by
secret sharing of information of the two operating sequences, al-
though the randomness of states of the two operating sequences is
not a stringent criteria.
As for example, let us take the following two operating sequences
of two different pairs of random quantum states.
S0 = {|A〉1, |A〉2, |B〉3, |B〉4, |A〉5, |B〉6, |B〉7, |A〉8, ......|A〉n};
S1 = {|C〉1, |D〉2, |C〉3, |D〉4, |C〉5, |D〉6, |C〉7, |D〉8, .....|D〉n},
where S0 and S1 stand for bit 0 and 1 respectively and n is mod-
erately large number. Information of these two sequences S0 and
S1 are shared between sender Alice, and receiver Bob. Key, the
sequence of random sequences of random quantum states, is, KN =
{S0, S1, S1, S0, S1, S0, S1, S0, S0, S1, .......} , where N is the num-
ber of bits in the key. Obviously, N is greater than 2n since 2n bits
(standard meaning) are shared.
First, we shall present a QKD protocol using superposition
states for the preparation of the two operating sequences. The rea-
son is, if we can construct the channel by superposition states and if
it gives quantum security then we do not have any ambiguity about
the quantumness of the channel. This particular QKD protocol can
be modified to accomplish more sophisticated cryptographic tasks
such as key splitting [9,10] and quantum bit commitment [11].
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Firstly, we describe the preparation procedure of the two se-
quences. Suppose, in a secret place, Alice and Bob have 2n hor-
izontally polarized (|↔〉) incoherent photons. To prepare a se-
quence they use n photons. To prepare S0, they split the wave
function of each photon with a symmetric (50:50) beam splitter.
After splitting they do one of the two things in one of the path,
called s : toss a coin, and if the result is ”tail” they do nothing
(|↔〉s −→ |↔〉s) and if ”head”, unitarily rotates the polarization
by 90◦(|↔〉s −→ |l〉s). In the other path, called r, they do nothing
(|↔〉r −→ |↔〉r). They repeat this procedure for n photons. The
states are :
|A〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |↔〉s)
|B〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |l〉s)
To prepare S1, similarly after splitting a wave function they do
one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin; if ”heads”,
unitarily rotates by 45◦(|↔〉s −→ |րւ〉s) and if ”tail”, unitarily
rotates by 135◦(|↔〉s −→ |տց〉s). Similarly in the other path r,
they do nothing. They repeat this procedure for n photons. The
states are :
|C〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |րւ〉s)
|D〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |տց〉s)
By the above operation, they essentially prepare the two operating
sequences of superposition states. These superposition states are
mutually nonorthogonal states and they can be represented by the
following base states:
|↔〉r, |l〉r, |↔〉s, |l〉s
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In this basis, the density matrix of the two sequences is,
ρ = 1/4


2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


Now they are separated. Alice will transmit the two operating
sequences at random. For clarity, let us think that Alice transmits
a single bit, either S0 or S1. Bob’s task is to recover the bit. As
density matrices are same, one may think, how Bob will recover it.
Bob can independently recover the bit value in different ways since
he knows the preparation code of the both types of possible bits,
although their density matrices are same (note that, ρ0 = ρ1 for
earlier example). Whatever be the identification processes, Bob’s
objective is to recover the bit value from the shared information.
Basically there are two types of measurement tricks:
1. Sequence of measurements is predetermined according to the
preparation codes.
2. Sequence of measurements is not predetermined according to the
preparation codes.
In this protocol, we shall use conclusive which path (WP) infor-
mation to recover the bit value by using the second method. But
mere WP information is not enough to identify the states and bit
values. Bob needs which-path of which-state (WPWS) information
to identify the individual states and bit values. But WPWS in-
formation is also not enough , he needs which-path of which-state
of which density matrix (WPWSWD) information to identify the
states and the bit values (here which density matrix means how it
was prepared). Next we shall see how to get WPWS information.
Suppose there are two sets of dual analyzers (DA) on the end of
the two resulting paths. Suppose the orientations of DA are : i)
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DA0 = {0◦r : 0◦s} ii) DA1 = {0◦r : 45◦s}. The measurements produce
three types (α, β, γ) of results: α = (
√
r
: ×s),β= (×r : √s), γ =
(×r : ×s) where ”√” and ” × ” stand for ” yes” and ” no” results
respectively. The probabilities of these three kinds of results cor-
responding to the four different superposition states are given in
table 1 and 2 considering the statistical weight of the states and
orientations of DA. The results α and β provide which-path (WP )
information and the result γ gives no-path (NP )information. The
result α does not give anyWPWS information for any of the above
two settings of DA. The NP information, corresponding to the re-
sult γ, is always inconclusive for any of the two settings of the
DA. The only result β provides conclusive WPWS information
for proper choice of above two settings of DA. The WPWS in-
formation conclusively determines the state |A〉i for DA0 and the
state |C〉i for DA1. But we need WPWSWD information to recover
the bit value.
As Bob does not know the bit value in advance, he uses two sets
of DA at random according to the second trick. The measurements
yield two sets of random results. Firstly, Bob discards inconclusive
results (α and γ) from both the sets. For the time being, let us
assume that the states |A〉i are at even positions and the states
|C〉i are at odd positions in the sequence S0 and S1 respectively. If
the bit is 0, the reduced sequences of results will like this (see the
2nd col. of the tables),
P n/8={..., β4, ....., β10, ......., β18, ...., β32........} for DA0,
If the bit is 1 then it will look like:
Qn/8 = {..., β3, ...., β11, ..... β21, ....., β27, ........} for DA1
where n/8 is the reduced length of the sequences( 75% results are
discarded). It means Bob will only check whether β is missing in
odd or even possitions of his two reduced sequences of results to re-
cover the bit value. But the state |A〉i and |C〉i will not have regular
distributions; they are randomly distributed. Yet the technique of
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recovery of bit value is almost same. Bob first discards the states
corresponding to the discarded events from both of the shared se-
quences. Now with these two reduced sequences of results (P n/8
and Qn/8) and two reduced sequences of states (S
n/8
0 and S
n/8
1 ),
he performs four correlation tests to identify the bit. Out of these
tests, only one of the reduced sequences of results will be totally
correlated (assuming noise is not present) with one of the reduced
sequences of states. Recovery of the bit value means recovery of
WPWSWD information.
Security: First, we want security directly from no-cloning princi-
ple. It means we need bit by bit by (sequence by sequence) secu-
rity as this is a repetitive code. In bit by bit security, Alice will
not send the next sequence, until she is confirmed that Bob’s re-
ceived sequence was uncorrupted. Therefore, after transmission of
each bit, the feedback communication is necessary. This feedback
communication should be authentic communication. Like existing
QKD schemes, if we want to use classical authentication [12] we
need some additional secret data. It implies that a single created
data can be made secure by using more secure data! This is totally
unrealistic. We need new kind of authentication technique.
Quantum authentication (QA): For authentication, following
feedback technique can be taken. If the received sequence is uncor-
rupted, Bob can send back the same sequence or the other to Alice.
If Alice also found it uncorrupted she will send the next sequence to
Bob. Otherwise Alice will stop transmission and reject the two op-
erating sequences. There is no room for peaceful co-existence with
eavesdropper. In contrast, in existing QKD, one can compromise
with eavesdropper.
Silent features:
1. Security and authentication are simultaneously achieved by the
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protocol itself. Nowhere it has been revealed.
2. For QKD, classical authentication and classical channel cannot
be used (at least classical channel can be used for QA in one of our
entanglement-based scheme [13])
3. If the users do not share information of the two operating se-
quences, still key/message can be recovered at the cost of security.
As if receiver impersonates as eavesdropper to clone the key.
Key splitting : Key splitting is one of the important task of
cryptography. The purpose is to distribute a key securely to two (or
many) receivers to make them mutually dependent on each other.
The above two-party protocol can be extended to perform this task.
Suppose two receivers, Bob and Sonu, in the two resulting paths,
where Bob is on the path r and Sonu on the path s and both of them
share information of the same two operating sequences with Alice.
Notice that, only s is the bit-carrying path. So Sonu independently
can identify the bit values. That is, she can have WPWSWD infor-
mation using single analyzer with proper orientation [see discussion
in ref. 11]. But Bob cannot. Bob always gets the same truncated
state |↔〉r which never carries any bit values. To give equal oppor-
tunity to Bob, Alice can make the path r as bit-carrying path.
Then the new superpostion states are:
|A〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉s + |↔〉r)
|B〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉s + |l〉r)
|C〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉s + |րւ〉r)
|D〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉s + |տց〉r)
Note that Alice does not change their shared secrets, she will use
the same two shared sequences to transmit the bit values to either
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Bob or Sonu. Note that, the positions of the states in the two
operating sequences are not changed only the preparation of the
states are changed. Due to this action, both of them are in similar
position. Now if Alice randomly selects (randomness is meant for
key-splitting) paths to transmit bit values both of them will get
50% bits. So they have to co-operate to access the full key.
Splitting the state vector into many paths and making every path
as bit-carrying path at random (randomness is meant for key split-
ting) the protocol can be extended to distribute the key among
many users. As for example, input state (0◦ photon) can be split
up into three parts r, s and t (1:1:1) in four following ways, simply
using triple-slit and single polarization rotator.
|A〉i = 1/
√
3(|↔〉r + |↔〉s + |↔〉t)
|B〉i = 1/
√
3(|↔〉r + |↔〉s + |l〉t)
|C〉i = 1/
√
3(|↔〉r + |↔〉s + |րւ〉t)
|D〉i = 1/
√
3(|↔〉r + |↔〉s + |տց〉t)
These states can be used to prepare two operating sequences. The
density matrix of the sequence of states |A〉i and |B〉i (1:1) and
the sequence of states |C〉i and |D〉i (1:1) in the representation R
corresponding to the following sequence of base states-
{|↔〉r, |l〉r, |↔〉s, |l〉s, |↔〉t, |l〉t} - is,
ρ = 1/6


2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


Three receivers are at the end of three paths. Here bit-carrying
path is t, so only receiver on path t will get the bit. If Alice ran-
domly changes the bit-carrying path giving equal importance to
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each path, then each of the three receivers will get 33.33% bits of
the key. Of course, who will get the bit it is his/her duty to pursue
QA. Here op-operation is required only to access the full key. This
is accomplished by the same apparatus. Therefore, the protocol will
be more powerful than other key splitting protocols which use sepa-
rate apparatus, since any denial of receiving bit values can be legally
challenged by sender and other receiver(s). Clearly this advantage
arises from superposition states. In each bit level, co-operation can
be guaranteed in our entanglement-based scheme [14].
In all the above protocols, states are mutually non orthogonal and
density matrices of the two sequences are same. Mutual nonorthog-
onality and equivalence of density matrices are the most powerful
combinations for this alternative QKD on disentangled state. Sup-
pose the two sequences, having same density matrices, (ρ0 = ρ1)
are prepared by two different pair of orthogonal states (say, one
sequence is made by 0◦ and 90◦ and the other is made by 45◦ and
135◦ polarized states). This is another interesting quantum channel
however, but so far security is concerned this will be a weak quan-
tum channel. Intercepting a single sequence, Eve will not get the
bit value but can evade detection if she fortunately chooses the cor-
rect orthogonal basis. On the other hand, in a protocol where two
sequences of two same or different pairs of non orthogonal states,
having unequal density matrices,(ρ0 6= ρ1) are used, Eve can get
the bit value from the single sequence but cannot evade detection (
for the above protocols ρ0 6= ρ1 if coherent states are used). If two
criteria are imposed i.e. density matrices are same and states are
non orthogonal for both sequences, then Eve will not get the bit
value still she will introduce error. As if bank robber is caught as
soon as he/she proceeds towards the bank. The system is extremely
sensitive. In contrast, in the existing QKD protocols eavesdropping
is detected only after leakage of some of the bit values.
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On the basis of indistinguishability of differently prepared den-
sity matrix, once Park claimed [15] to have refuted the legitimacy
of individual quantum state description. Here we saw that same
density matrix can be quantum mechanically distinguished (in his
book, D’espagnat [16] presented a classical separation method).
But we would not like to make any counter claim, rather we leave
the issue of quantum state description to be freshly reviewed in the
light of this information proccessing.
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Table 1. Joint probabilities when DA at (0◦r : 0
◦
s)
States P(√
r
:×s) P(×r:
√
s
) P(×r:×s)
|A〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |↔〉s) 1/4 1/4∗ 0
|B〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |l〉s) 1/4 0 1/4
|C〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |րւ〉s) 1/4 1/8 1/8
|D〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |տց〉s) 1/4 1/8 1/8
* Only this result (β) provides conclusive WPWS information.
Table 2. Joint probabilities when DA at (0◦r : 45
◦
s)
States P(√
r
:×s) P(×r:
√
s
) P(×r:×s)
|A〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |↔〉s) 1/4 1/8 1/8
|B〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |l〉s) 1/4 1/8 1/8
|C〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |րւ〉s) 1/4 1/4∗ 0
|D〉i = 1/
√
2(|↔〉r + |տց〉s) 1/4 0 1/4
* Only this result (β) provides conclusive WPWS information.
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